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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of good governance in elections compared to
the role of the economy. The latter is considered the key factor in electoral survival,
while governance issues are rarely included in politicians’ discourse or campaigning
strategies. Using the ParlGov data and the ICRG indicators for 160 elections, the
analysis shows that good governance matters, but mainly for developing countries.
Economic growth is an important electoral topic in most of the elections, but its
effect varies systematically across contexts. The impact of each good governance
and the economy gets weaker as the other worsens, and their conditional effects are
moderated by the level of economic development.
Keywords: elections, economic voting, governance, corruption, three way interaction,
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11 Introduction
Elections are citizens’ means to hold the government accountable for the economic, social,
and institutional development of the country. A vast majority of electoral research focuses
on the role of the economy and less on the importance of bad governance, with some
exceptions in recent years. Regarding the impact of governance, researchers look at
corruption as a proxy for good governance, and conclude that incumbents are punished
for corruption only if they also underperform economically. This paper extends this
research by considering the role of overall quality of governance in elections, and examines
the conjuncted trade-off between good governance and the economy in countries with
different levels of economic development. The results show that good governance and the
economy moderate each others’ effect, and contrary to the results in studies of corruption,
incumbents are punished for bad governance even when there is economic growth. These
findings are stronger in developed countries than in wealthy economies.
Previous studies of corruption (e.g. information about, allegations or individual evalua-
tions of corruption) show that its effect on vote decision and electoral outcome is small
(Fackler and Lin 1995; Hibbing and Welch 1997; Peters and Welch 1980) and that it is tol-
erated by voters as long as the economy is doing well (Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga
2013; Klašnja and Tucker 2013; Choi and Woo 2010). It is however debatable whether
voters close their eyes to bad governance in times of economic growth. Overall, gover-
nance affects a larger range of aspects of citizens’ lives, voters having multiple sources
of information regarding its performance. Dysfunctions in governance performance can
be easily blamed on the government, while corruption "is not limited to the incumbent
party, but [seen as] a problem of the overall political system or society in general" (Choi
and Woo 2010: 259).
Good governance is expected to have a positive effect moderated by economic downturns,
but a decline in the quality of governance can also reduce the impact of the economy on
election results. Governance crises seem to make people less likely to base their voting
decision on the state of the economy (Singer 2011b). Focusing only on the conditional
role of economic growth on the effect of governance, one can dismiss an important aspect
of the interdependence of good governance and the economy. Thus, this study examines
both sides of this interaction, taking also into account that these relationships can vary
across different levels of economic development.1
1Berry et al. (2012) show that researchers tend to focus only on one side of the interaction effects of
two variables, and "[a]s a result, they either underestimate or, more worryingly, overestimate the support
for their theories".
2Before examining the three-way interaction between economic growth, change in good
governance, and economic development, in section 2 I consider shortly the previous lit-
erature on good governance and its consequences in electoral behavior, and discuss why
governance is important in elections at the beginning of section 3. A theoretical model
of the interdependent effects of good governance and economic conditions is proposed in
subsection 3.1. The analysis in section 4 presents the aggregate level models of change
in vote share, and the last section discusses its results and concludes.
2 Good governance and accountability
In the last two decades, the topic of well-performing institutions - good governance vs.
malfunctioning governments - has increasingly attracted the attention of social scien-
tists and international organizations. The discussion has moved from non-democratic vs.
democratic regimes to well-functioning institutions vs. poor governance (Bok 2010; Hel-
liwell 2006). In 1994, the United Nations Development Programme (UNPD) published
a first document entitled Initiatives for Change stating the main goals of governance
initiatives. Three years later, a first definition of governance was included in Governance
for Sustainable Human Development : "the exercise of economic, political, and adminis-
trative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels, comprising the mechanisms,
processes, and institutions through which that authority is directed" (UNPD 1997).2
Good governance is not only a means to promote economic development in developing
countries, but also a political norm in prosperous democracies. Well-performing insti-
tutions promote economic development (Rodrik et al. 2004), efficient public spending
(Holmberg et al. 2009), political trust (Rothstein and Stolle 2008) and individual happi-
ness (Bok 2010; Helliwell 2006). In electoral research, scholars demonstrate that evalua-
tions of education or health care standards, or level of crime affect voters’ support for the
incumbent and/or its popularity (Bartle 2003; Clarke 2009; Erikson et al. 2002; Hobolt
et al. 2012; Johnston and Pattie 2001). Other studies show that good governance aspects
- ranging from crime rates and school performance league tables to measures of bureau-
cratic efficiency - matter in local elections (James and John 2007; Boyne et al. 2009; Oliver
and Ha 2007). Among the good governance aspects, most of previous studies have fo-
cused on corruption. The ongoing debate is whether incumbents are punished for charges
of corruption or not (Fackler and Lin 1995; Hibbing and Welch 1997; Peters and Welch
2Without a well-defined theory of governance, several definitions of governance and good governance
have been used since good governance was first mentioned in an official document. See Grindle (2007)
for a review.
31980; Manzetti and Wilson 2007; Shabad and Slomczynski 2011). Recently, scholars have
claimed that corruption is relevant in election only when economic performance is simul-
taneously under pressure (Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga 2013; Klašnja and Tucker
2013). In the next section, I examine why incumbents are held accountable for changes
in governance although they seem to escape punishment when there is high corruption.
I also discuss how the effect of good governance is interdependent on the economy.
3 Do voters react to the quality of governance?
The "responsible party government model" states that voters control the incumbents
based on their judgments of performance, and use their votes to punish or reward them
(Jones and McDermott 2004; Ranney 1982). The literature on political accountability
and performance-based voting is mostly about the role of the economy in elections, and
shows that incumbents are rewarded for a well performing economy and punished for
economic downturns, accordingly (Fiorina 1981; Hibbing and Alford 1981; Lewis-Beck
and Stegmaier 2000). However, incumbents are also held accountable for fiscal policies,
war casualties (De Mesquita and Siverson 1995) or natural disasters (Gasper and Reeves
2011; Healy and Malhotra 2009) . It is then expected that overall governance performance
also affects incumbents’ electoral support.
According to the scholarship on contextual effects, people are attentive to the environment
surrounding them, and form opinions and evaluations based on personal observation, in-
formal interaction, and mass media (Books and Prysby (1991), Cox (1969); see also Marsh
(2002) for a critical review of contextual effects). Voters observe public officials and insti-
tutions, and evaluate their performance. In addition, they discuss about their experience
with political actors, bureaucrats, and other public officials with other individuals, and
adjust their perceptions accordingly. In countries with high levels of corruption, citizens
expect the political institutions to control and punish corrupt politicians. In contexts
with inefficient bureaucracies, individuals have to deal with red tape and incompetent
public officials, and conclude that the bureaucratic system does not work. For those
voters who try to build a business, governmental regulations and the ease of dealing with
administrative issues give them cues to evaluate governance performance. Citizens also
have perceptions on the level of crime, judicial efficiency, the performance of schools,
hospitals, public transportation or communication systems in their community or other
cities and weigh them in their assessments of government’s effectiveness.
Incumbents are held accountable for the quality of governance in their mandate since
4the central government is the only actor involved in the governance process who is
elected. In spite of the new processes of decentralizing the decision making power to
non-governmental actors (private or public-private collaborations), the government still
has the regulatory power over many social and economic issues, as well as the private
or private-public contracts for service delivery and management. The incumbents at all
levels have an important say in structuring the public sector or public-private collabo-
rations. Voters can express their dissatisfaction with these services by sanctioning the
government for the performance of the governance system.
Some may say that voters do not have the necessary information to assess the quality
of governance and hold the incumbent accountable. Others argue that the paradox of
ignorance (i.e. the claim that the rational voter is uninformed about economic and
political issue) is exaggerated and, in fact, the degree of voter’s lack of political knowledge
is not that high (Aidt 2000). Citizens use cues efficiently to make reasonable decisions and
evaluate officials’ activity (Lupia 1998), and assess the economic conditions correctly and
make accurate evaluations of governments performance (Kramer 1971; Lewis-Beck and
Stegmaier 2000; Sanders and Gavin 2004). While some studies on governance show little
correlation between the subjective and objective measures of government performance
(Swindell and Kelly 2000; Van Ryzin 2008), others suggest that citizens are accurate in
their predictions of the condition of public services in their community (Ostrom 1999),
and similar subjective and objective indicators are statistically associated (Parks 1984).
It is then plausible to assume that changes in the quality of governance are reflected
in electoral support because voters can assess these changes and keep the incumbent
accountable.
3.1 The interdependent effects of good governance and economic
conditions
Recently, scholars have come up with the idea of a conditional corruption voting.3 In-
cumbents are punished for corruption or allegations of corruption only if they also un-
derperform economically. Several theoretical arguments have been proposed to explain
this conditionality: corruption is a second order concern behind the state of the economy
(Klašnja and Tucker 2013: 537), voters trade off perceived political honesty for economic
prosperity (Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga 2013: 1195), or economic performance fil-
ters the information about corruption and voters do not assign the same weight to it
3See Klašnja and Tucker (2013) and Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga (2013) for individual level,
as well as Choi and Woo (2010) for aggregate level analysis.
5unless it is seen as the cause of economic decline, especially in developing countries (Choi
and Woo 2010: 255).
Similar arguments from theories of issue salience (Krosnick 1990; Fournier et al. 2003),
information-processing theory of attitude formation (Higgings and King 1981; Bizer and
Krosnick 2001), or supply-side conditional economic voting hypotheses (Tucker 2006) can
explain the interaction between the economy and good governance. Like corruption, the
relevance of bad governance can be exacerbated by economic decline if voters see a link
between good governance and economic growth, and consider the former a cause of the
latter. However, it is debatable whether voters would close their eyes in front of bad
governance if there is economic growth. Unlike corruption, overall bad governance af-
fects a larger range of aspects of citizens’ lives, thus economic growth should be less of
a moderator of the government’s overall performance. The economy may be the key to
assure popular support, but voters are unlikely to enjoy it if the institutions and gover-
nance mechanisms are underperforming. Hence, incumbents receive voters’ appreciation
for economic performance, but they are punished for the difficulties and drawbacks that
citizens encounter when interacting with political and public institutions.
Bad governance could also reduce the salience of economic performance by drawing peo-
ple’s attention away from the economy. As Singer argues, governance crises make people
less likely to base their voting decision on the state of the economy (Singer 2011b) and
even during a recession a significant part of the electorate base their vote on non-economic
issues (Singer 2011a). The connection between good governance and the economy can
be illustrated in four different scenarios: when both are in crisis, when either one or the
other is badly affected, and when both are in good shape. Given that previous studies
assume a stronger punishment for both bad governance and economic recession, I define
α as the threshold for an economic crisis and β for the threshold for a governance crisis:
1. economic growth<α and change in good governance<β: both variables are expected
to have a strong role in elections.
2. economic growth>α and change in good governance<β: good governance is the
salient issue in elections and the economy matters less than in (1).
3. economic growth<α and change in good governance>β: the economy is the salient
issue in elections and good governance matters less than in (1) or (2).
4. economic growth>α and change in good governance>β: considering that "the econ-
omy is always an important issue to voters" (Wlezien 2005: 556), I expect economic
growth to have the main role in election outcomes.
6In a nutshell, the effect of good governance or the economy gets weaker as the other wors-
ens. When both decline the incumbent loses the most. Overall, the effect of the economy
is expected to be stronger than the one of the quality of governance. This expectations
are partially grounded on the valence politics theory. Both good governance and eco-
nomic growth are valence issues (Stokes 1963, 1992): everyone supports less corruption,
better governance and economic growth. According to the scholarship on valence politics,
incumbents are replaced based on their competence and performance on these issues only
if the rival is better equipped to govern (Ho et al. 2013; Clarke and Whitten 2013). Poor
improvements in corruption and good governance can then remain unpunished if voters
do not have better options to choose from, or if incumbents show competence in other
sectors. In scenarios 2, 3 and 4, incumbents may still seem a better alternative given their
performance on the other issue, while in case 1 their failure on both economic growth
and institutional performance can make the opposition seem like the lesser of two evils.
The α and β thresholds may however differ across countries. In some socio-economic
contexts people are more resilient or permissive than in others and the magnitude of
economic (and here good governance) voting depends then on the social settings and
the historical context Lin (1999). In this case, it is the level of economic and institu-
tional development that is expected to condition individuals’ perceptions of governance
or economic crises and their effects on election results.
Choi and Woo (2010), and Zechmeister and Zizumbo-Colunga (2013) show that in devel-
oping countries incumbents are punished for corruption only when the economy worsens
too. The experiments done by Klašnja and Tucker (2013) have similar results in a high
corruption country (Moldova), which also has a low level of economic development, but
not in a low corruption country (Sweden), which is also a highly developed economy. In
the latter, voters react negatively to corruption regardless of the state of the economy.
I expect that the four scenarios above are present in developing countries and/or those
with poor governance because voters are willing to overlook underperformance in one
area when the goal in the other sector is met. As countries develop economically and
institutionally, voters are expected to become less permissive and thus the conditional
relation between economic growth and change in good governance should is eroded.
74 Research design
In this section, I test empirically the above relationships. Previous studies focused mostly
on the role of corruption, measured in absolute terms rather than the change in perfor-
mance. I extend the analysis to the overall quality of governance and test the effect of
both change and absolute level. In this way, the results are not driven by the fact that
voters in countries with a persistent level of corruption/bad governance may not pun-
ish the incumbent because no changes have occurred during the term. Because of the
low level of change in the corruption control indicator (in less than 25% of cases in the
sample), this section presents only the results from models with good governance.4
For models of incumbent support explained by changes in the quality of governance, data
for the vote share of the incumbent and corresponding indicators of the quality of gov-
ernance for two consecutive elections are necessary. The ParlGov database (Döring and
Manow 2010) provides the election results for 38 European and OECD countries between
1900 and 2012. The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG 2012) has indicators of
good governance available for all elections between 1984 and 2011 (which includes more
cases than other datasets, e.g. the World Bank indicators of good governance which
are available only from 1996). The analysis focuses thus on 160 parliamentary elections
between 1984 and 2011 in 31 countries.5 I had to exclude the elections when the prime
minister’s party was in a pre-electoral alliance or the party split during the electoral cycle,
because of the level of error involved in disentangling its vote share from the vote share
of the alliance.
Each case is an election in country c at time t. Because the elections when the prime-
minister’s party was in a pre-electoral alliance or the party split during the electoral term
disrupt the country time series, I cannot use panel data analysis, but still have to control
for the dependence between multiple elections in the same country. To do that, I use the
Huber-White standard error clustered according to country.6 The dependent variable is
change in vote share of the prime minister’s party since the last elections. Thus, I run
OLS regressions with clustered standard error. Similar results are obtained when support
for the incumbent is estimated as the change in overall vote share for the coalition parties
4The ones with corruption are available in the online Appendix, but should be interpreted with
precaution.
5Countries included in the analysis: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ice-
land, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Latvia, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand,
Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden
6See Moulton (1986) and Wooldridge (2003) for several applications of cluster-sample methods and
Hellwig and Samuels (2008) for an example of using cluster standard error in economic voting models.
8in the cabinet. For elections when several cabinet changes took place during the electoral
term, I considered the change in vote share for the prime minister of the last cabinet
formed before the elections.
The key independent variable is point change in good governance in the election year, with
high values indicating an improvement in the quality of governance. It is measured using
the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG 2012) indicators of political risks in a coun-
try.Good governance is calculated as the average of corruption (i.e. excessive patronage,
nepotism, job reservations, favor-for-favors, secret party funding, and suspiciously close
ties between politics and business), bureaucratic efficiency (i.e. whether the bureaucracy
is autonomous from political pressure, has an established mechanism for recruitment and
training, and can govern without drastic changes in policy and interruption in govern-
ment services), business regulation (i.e. an assessment of factors affecting the risk to
investment: contract viability/expropriation, profits repatriation and payment delays),
and judicial effectiveness (an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal
system and of popular observance of the law).7 The ICRG indicators are based on the
evaluations of the Political Risk Group (PRG) editors using pre-set questions about the
political risk in each country. These are calculated using identical rules for all countries,
which makes the cross-national and cross-time comparison possible, as opposed to other
indicators of governance based on public opinion or expert surveys (e.g. World Bank
Worldwide Governance Indicators or Transparency International indicator of Control of
Corruption).
Compared to the volatile leading indicators of economic conditions (e.g. unemployment,
inflation), quality of governance is a slowly changing dimension of government perfor-
mance. In the sample, the level of corruption remained constant in over 76% of elections,
the overall governance in 32% of cases. The biggest drop in overall governance was -0.28
in Austria in 1994, while the biggest improvement was 0.58 in Malta in 1992. One could
then argue that voters have a hard time observing any changes in the quality of gov-
ernance in the year prior to elections, but they could react to cumulative performance
throughout the term. Models including these measures of change have similar results,
which indicates that for the quality of governance as for economic growth, voters sub-
stitute election-year performance for the entire term (Healy and Lenz 2014), though a
positive change in governance in the election year is not always associated with an overall
improvement throughout the term (r=.52).
7Some of the indicators were initially measured on a 0 to 4, 6 or 12 point scale. They were all recoded
into a 0-6 scale
9Given that the main focus of the paper is on the conjuncted trade-off between good gov-
ernance and the economy, the other two important independent variables are economic
growth, measured as the year percent change in real GDP in the election year (from Inter-
national Monetary Fund (2013)), and the economic development level, calculated as the
logarithm of GDP per capita (from International Monetary Fund (2013)). As expected,
overall governance and economic development level are highly correlated (Kaufmann et al.
2007b, a; Kurtz and Schrank 2007), but the correlation between economic growth and
change in good governance is weak. The absolute level of governance and corruption
control appears to be associated with changes in the economy or governance only in
developing countries. While economic growth is positively correlated with governance
performance (r=.26), its correlation with corruption control is negative (r=-.13). Higher
levels of corruption do bring faster economic growth in developing countries (Choi and
Woo 2010), but bad governance seems to hinder it.
To address potential differences in government support due to the democratic quality,
I control for democratic experience (measured in years since the country had the first
democratic election, from the Polity database (Marshall and Jaggers 2012). The number
of years of democracy is preferred to the polity rating measure, since the latter includes
other aspects of institutional quality that could be directly linked to governance indi-
cators. I also control for whether the incumbent is a coalition, and if the election took
place after the economic recession in 2008. To take into account the stable base of polit-
ical parties given the partisanship and social cleavages in the country, I include previous
vote share for the incumbent in the previous elections from the same ParlGov database
(Döring and Manow 2010). Powell Jr and Whitten (1993) argued that using the results
from previous elections gives identical coefficients in models with incumbent vote share
or change in incumbency’s vote share as dependent variable. These models measure then
how change in governance and the economy alters the base of support of the incumbent.
The next section presents different models of electoral support for the prime minister’s
party explained by change in good governance (Models 1-5 in Table 1). To examine
the conditional relationship between the impact of economic growth and change in the
quality of governance, I include an interaction term between them. Also, to account for
the differences in this conjuncted trade-off in countries with different levels of economic
development, a three-way interaction term with change in good governance, economic
growth and the level of wealth is considered.8.
8Models with the three-way interaction between level of good governance, economic growth and
change in good governance are only presented in the online Appendix since all the interactions with the




The models in Table 1 test the magnitude and significance of different interactions be-
tween economic development, change in the quality of governance, and economic growth
that are part of the three-way interaction in model 5. The results in model 1 – with
no interaction terms – indicate that incumbents benefit out of improvements in good
governance and the economy. Both indicators are positively associated with vote share,
and their coefficients are statistically significant.9 Thus, prime minister’s party receives
on average 1.13% extra votes for a 0.1 point increase in governance effectiveness and 0.6%
votes for 1% economic growth.10 The impact of the quality of governance in elections is
comparable to the role of the economy (i.e. one standard deviation increase in economic
growth or the quality of governance is associated with 1.5% or 1.8% increase in the vote
share, with their 95% confidence intervals overlapping). These results reflect the averaged
effects of these two independent variables across the observed range of economic wealth
level, economic growth, or change in good governance. Models 2-5 show that these effects
are, in fact, moderated by the other two predictors. Before discussing these models, a
brief presentation of the control variables is necessary.
[Table 1 - about here]
Incumbents with a large base - a high absolute vote in the previous elections - lose elec-
toral support easier in the next elections. The positive statistically significant coefficient
of economic wealth shows that, all else being equal, incumbents have an advantage in
prosperous democracies. The other control variables do not have statistically significant
coefficients, but if they had, their effect would have been as expected. In a coalition, the
prime minister’s party is more vulnerable and loses more of its previous support than
if it was a single-party cabinet. As countries get more democratic, the electorate is less
supportive towards the chief executive, and after 2008, the incumbents have lost more
votes than before the financial crisis.
The conjuncted trade-off between change in good governance and economic growth in
models of electoral support for the incumbent is tested empirically using Interaction 1
in Model 2. The increase in the R-squared11 is very small, thus a conservative scholar
would consider this interaction substantially insignificant. Before testing the strength of
9A coefficient is considered statistically significant at 5% significance level.
10Given that the observed range of economic growth (-7 to 12%) and change in good governance (-0.3
and 0.6), the discussion of the coefficients is done for a 0.1 increase in good governance and 1% economic
growth.
11Because the standard errors are based on the robust variance estimator, the likelihood-ratio tests
are not appropriate, thus I do not report this criterion of goodness of fit.
11
this trade-off for different levels of economic wealth in Model 5, the interaction between
change in good governance and economic development (Interaction 2) was included in
Model 3, and the one between economic growth and development (Interaction 3) in Model
4. While, the latter improves only slightly the goodness of fit in model 4, the interaction
of economic wealth with change in good governance has all three constituent coefficients
statistically significant and the best model fit in Table 1. Only model 5, with all four
components of the three-way interaction, has a slightly higher R-squared, but with three
extra predictors. The results of a Wald test, hypothesizing that the coefficients of these
three variables are simultaneously equal to zero, does not reject the null hypothesis, thus
model 5 is not a better model than model 3. However, we cannot know whether the
effect of change in good governance or/and economic growth is conditional on the level
of economic wealth only by looking at the coefficients (Berry et al. 2012). Figures 1
to 3 present thus the marginal effects of the interaction components in Models 2 to
5. Conservative readers may disregard the results in Model 2, 4 and 5 because of the
insignificant change in the R-squared, others will be interested in the magnitude of the
conditional effects despite the small change in goodness of fit.
[Figure 1 - about here]
Figure 1 presents the marginal effect of change in good governance across the observed
range of the economic growth (the left-hand-side graph). Contrary to previous research,
this figure shows that the effect of change in good governance increases with more eco-
nomic growth and becomes insignificant in times of economic crisis or stagnation. Gover-
nance improvement brings more votes to the incumbent if there is an economic growth of
at least 2%. It seems that changes in the quality of governance do not matter in elections
when there is high economic growth (higher than 8.7%), but this insignificant result can
be an artefact of the isolated extreme values of the variable on the x-axis in Figure 1
(Berry et al. 2012).
Figure 1 also presents the other side of the interaction between economic growth and
change in good governance: the marginal effect of economic growth across the observed
range of change in good governance (the right-hand-side graph). As predicted, the econ-
omy matters less in elections in times of governance crises. Economic effects appear
insignificant for changes in good governance smaller than -0.14 or higher than 0.24.
Given that these represent only 11% of cases in the dataset, which includes several post-
communist countries in transition, the results should be interpreted with precaution and
not generalized for older democracies without additional research. When statistically sig-
12
nificant, the impact of change in good governance and economic growth is comparable.12
[Figure 2 - about here]
The results in Figure 2 complement the findings from Figure 1 by showing the marginal
effect of change in good governance and economic growth across the observed range of
economic development. The exponential decline in the marginal effect of change in the
quality of governance on vote share is explained by the logarithmic transformation of
economic development, measured as GDP per capita.13
Incumbents can significantly improve their electoral outcome with an increase in overall
governance or positive economic growth in countries with a poor economy. When the
level of development is higher than $18,000 or $35,000, the marginal effects of change in
the quality of governance or economic growth respectively, are statistically insignificant
(i.e. the 95% confidence interval includes 0). In models with cumulative change in good
governance, its effect is statistically insignificant only in countries with a GDP per cap
higher than $40,000, which can be explained by the relatively small annual changes in
good governance in OECD countries compared to economies in transition. When GDP is
low and the institutional system is not well developed, any change is perceptible during
the course of a year, compared to changes in well grounded systems where people may
notice them only throughout the electoral cycle.
Improvements in the quality of governance or the economy bring twice as many votes
in developing economies compared to countries with an average level of wealth. For the
former, one standard deviation increase in good governance or economic growth leads to
an increase of up to 5% votes in the vote share, while for the latter, the same change is
associated with only 2% extra votes. These findings confirm partially the results from
previous studies: in bad economic conditions, seen as low level of economic development,
corruption and other institutional malfunctions weigh more in elections. The same seems
to apply to the economy: in wealthy countries, other factors than the economic growth get
on the public agenda during the elections. If we consider that good governance is highly
correlated with economic wealth, the insignificant marginal effect of economic growth for
low values of economic development in Figure 2 may confirm Singer’s (2011) expectation
12The marginal effects were calculated for 1 standard deviation increase in both graphs for this kind
of comparison.
13Using the logarithmic indicator improves the goodness of fit in models 1-5 and makes the interaction
statistically relevant in model 2 in Table 1. As the histogram of economic wealth shows in Figure 2, the
economy reached a level higher than $50.000 per capita in only few election years . Using its logarithmic
transformation in the interaction with change in the quality of governance, the results in this figure are
not driven by the extreme values Berry et al. (2012). Then, excluding these elections from the analysis
does not change the results significantly.
13
that in times of governance crises, the economy is less relevant in elections.
[Figure 3 - about here]
In Figure 1, we saw that below a 2% increase in the economy and a 0.14 decline in
the quality of governance the effect of change in good governance and economic growth,
respectively, are insignificant. Thus, these levels can be the α and β thresholds proposed
in the theoretical section 3.1, and the relationships presented in Figure 1 describe partially
the scenarios 2 to 4. As hypothesized in the same section, these thresholds may differ
in countries with different levels of economic wealth. Figure 2 shows that the level of
development constrains the effects of economic growth and change in good governance,
and Figure 3 indicates that the absolute level of GDP affects also their contingent trade-
off.
The strongest effect of change in good governance is found in poor democracies when
economic growth is high. A more moderate effect, which increases only slightly with the
economic growth, is in countries with an average level of wealth, and almost no effect in
developed economies. However, the only statistically significant impact appears to be in
countries with a low level of wealth when the economic growth is higher than 2% but
lower than 9% (similar to the results in Figure 1).
Economic growth has also the strongest effect in poor economies and the weakest in
wealthy countries. In the former, the impact of the economy on incumbent’s support
increases with improvements in good governance, while in the latter the poor governance
makes it stronger. The marginal effect appears to be statistically significant only for
moderate changes in governance (similar to the results in Figure 1) when the development
level is higher than its mean.
An easier to grasp illustration of the interdependent effects of economic growth, change
in good governance, and economic development in Figures 1 to 3 is presented in Ta-
ble 2 which includes the expected change in vote share for different values of these three
predictors. These are estimated based on the results from model 5 in Table 1 for single
party cabinets, with 34% vote share in previous elections, in countries with 46 years of
democracy, and a four point overall governance, before the economic crisis in 2008.14
[Table 2 - about here]
All four scenarios proposed in the theoretical section can be identified among the 27
combinations in Table 2. In the first scenario, where both economic growth and change
14The continuous independent variables are held at their mean, except for overall governance, which
is set at a value of 4 (its mean is 5).
14
in good governance are below a threshold (here one standard deviation below the mean),
incumbents lose almost 10% votes in emerging economies, but no more than 2% in well
developed countries. These are, however, the worst outcome in Table 2. In scenarios 2 and
3, when only one of the predictors is below the threshold (Low), incumbents experience
the same negative result in poor countries, losing almost 8% if one of these is at an
average level, and around 6% if the other increases to a high level (here, mean plus one
standard deviation). Prime ministers in countries with average or high economic wealth
prefer the second scenario, where the quality of governance declines below the threshold
but the economy is not affected. In these cases, in highly developed countries, they lose
less than 1% of votes for an average economic growth, but can also win a bit more than
that in the case of a 5% rise in the economy. The expectations from the fourth scenario,
that the economy matters more than good governance when both exceed the threshold,
are validated in countries with an average or high economic development. In emerging
economies, the electoral benefits are the same if the economy or the governance improves.
4.2 Error in change in censored governance indicators
The ICRG indicators are scales from 0 to 6, so for values higher than 4, change in gov-
ernance cannot exceed 2. Therefore positive changes are not reported, which could lead
to measurement error and thus, biased and inconsistent coefficients. To see how the im-
pact of governance and the economy would differ if the indicators of change in governance
would not be measured with error, I use the method of simulation extrapolation for fitting
models with additive measurement error (SIMEX) (Hardin et al. 2003). Because replicate
measurements of governance were not available, I approximated the error variance of the
indicators of good governance and its change for a 80% or 90% reliability level (i.e. 100%
minus the reliability levels).
[Figure 4 - about here]
Figure 4 shows the coefficient estimates for change in quality of governance and economic
growth in Model 1 (Table 1) when quality of governance in the last elections and the
change of governance is measured with error. I calculate the coefficients of change in
governance and economic growth for two situations: when the reliability of governance
and change in governance is 80% (upper graphs) or 90% (lower graphs). I assume the
covariance between the errors of both indicators to be 0. The estimated coefficients are
calculated as a quadratic extrapolant of the scale factor λj (lambda), for how much extra
measurement error is added to the error-prone variable. The dots represent the average
of the estimated coefficients from 50 runs (simulations) for each scale factor λj(lambda).
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When λ=0, the estimate is the coefficient from a naive regression, where we assume
that our indicator was measured without error. When λ=-1, the estimate is the simex
estimate accounting for the measurement error for 90% or 80% reliability. Higher values
of lambda represent extra measurement error in variable change in good governance.
The differences between the simex and naive estimate are significantly smaller when one
excludes the level of good governance from the model.
The estimated coefficients and effects of change in good governance are higher when
one controls for the measurement error, and the coefficients of economic growth are
biased towards higher positive values when there is measurement error in the change
in governance. Using the simex method, however, does not solve the recent issues in
methodological debates concerning the uncertainty in the estimation and nature of the
governance indicators (Bovaird and Löffler 2003; Devarajan 2008).
One of these concerns refers to the validity of the ICRG indicators. Its concepts are based
on expert evaluations, which can be considered approximations of the objective measures
of the quality of governance. In the analysis, I assume that the link between objective
good governance and the ICRG indicators is accurate. However, two important non-
random errors can erode this link. First, experts’ subjective opinions on good governance
can affect their evaluations. Thus, the actual level of good governance in the country
is compared to an ideal type as perceived by the ICRG editors. One can assume that
this ideal type is based on internationally-recognized principles and standards and this
makes the indicators adequate for comparative studies, but voters in each country might
have their own ideal type that they keep the government accountable for. Secondly, some
scholars criticized the ICRG indicators for being driven to an important extent by large
scandals in the country considered. This means that the ICRG editors are more likely to
update the political risks measures when corruption control, regulatory quality, judicial
effectiveness or bureaucratic efficiency are on the public agenda. If this is true, then
the results in this paper should be read as showing that incumbents lose votes when
governance issues attract public attention.
5 Discussion and conclusions
The aim of this paper was to estimate the impact of good governance in elections com-
pared to the role of the economy. Previous research has focused on economic growth as
one of the key elements for incumbents’ survival. Several other scholars look at corruption
and argue that it matters only when there is economic decline. The analysis in this paper
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confirms and, at the same time, contradicts these results: good governance matters more
in poor economic contexts, but this contingent effect depends on the level of economic
wealth and not on the economic growth in the election year. There is, in fact, a positive
interdependent relationship between the effects of economic growth and change in good
governance: each has a stronger effect when the other increases, but almost no effect
for the other’s extreme negative values. In addition, the level of economic development
moderates not only the effect of the quality of governance, but also the role of the eco-
nomic growth in election results. Both weigh more in incumbents’ survival in developing
countries than in well established economies.
For economic voting scholars, the contingency of economic growth on the level of wealth
may come as a surprise. The results illustrate that the salience and the role of the economy
vary systematically across countries with different levels of economic development (Singer
2011b; Lin 1999). Its insignificant effect in highly developed countries may indicate that
voters in these countries weigh other factors more in their decisions, but conservative
researchers may question this effect given the poor goodness of fit in model 3 (Table 1).
There also seems to be little empirical evidence that the quality of governance matters
in developed economies. This may not be a salient issue in voters’ minds because it had
already achieved a high level of performance and, apart from temporary political scandals
on corruption and bureaucratic inefficiency, public agenda is not about governance. Or,
given that highly developed countries also have good governance performance, any change
in this direction is too small to be quantified by the ICRS editors in their evaluations or
by voters in their decisions.
When it comes to the conjuncted trade-off between good governance and the economy,
the analysis shows that, contrary to the already established belief that the economy is
always important and bad governance matters only when the economy also worsens, when
there is bad governance, the economy matters less than under good governance; and in
times of economic decline the quality of governance becomes less important. When both
worsen, their cumulative effect makes it more likely for the incumbents to be thrown
out. These findings support my theoretical assumption that incumbents’ failure in both
areas makes the opposition seem like a better option. These results hold mostly for
developing countries, where governance and the economy have the same effect in elections.
In countries with a level of economic development above the average, the role of the
economy outplays the impact of governance in elections.
The discrepancy between the established view in the literature and the above results can
be explained by the fact that I examine the overall good governance and test the effect
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of change, while the other scholars consider only one of its components, corruption, and
look at its absolute level. The effect of cumulative change in corruption on election results
is three times smaller than the effect of change in overall governance.15 If we focus only
on corruption we disregard other aspects of good governance that are relevant for the
development of a country and, apparently, for incumbents’ electoral survival.
It is also interesting that elections in developing countries are characterized by a high
electoral volatility that makes incumbents lose parts of their previous support even when
there is economic growth or positive change in the quality of governance. They can only
reduce the strong negative effects of volatility with high improvements in governance and
economic performance. This may explain why in some countries, voters seem to forgive
and forget incumbents’ misperformance, while in others, the rascals are thrown out for
small economic or institutional drawbacks.
If we assume that a low economic development level is highly associated with weak in-
efficient institutions, the results in this paper seem to contradict Manzetti and Wil-
son’s(2007) findings that people do not throw out the corrupt rascals in countries with
weak government institutions. However, Manzetti and Wilson (2007) look at individual
perceptions, while the analysis in this paper considers the impact of aggregate gover-
nance. Perceptions of corruption/bad governance can weigh less in voters decisions if
corruption is a persistent condition, but any drop can still be associated with fewer votes
to the incumbent. Nevertheless, this analysis does not make inferences about voters’
perceptions of governance performance and how much these matter in vote decisions. I
only examine the link between change in good governance and election outcomes at the
aggregate level. Future research will show whether individual assessments of the quality
of governance correlate with changes in the ICRG or World Bank indicators and whether
this judgment is considered in the final vote decision. Governance evaluations can be a
key independent factor explaining voting behavior or they can be only one of the many
issues voters weigh in their evaluations of government performance.
Overall, this paper shows that, as economic voting models predicted, economic growth is
an important electoral topic in most of the elections. Quality of governance, interestingly
matters the most in developing economies. Thus, incumbents in these countries should
aim to achieve higher levels of good governance not only because of aid conditionality
or international pressure, but also because of electoral pressure. Governance and the
economy are interconnected systems and a chief executive cannot focus the resources
either on promoting economic growth or good governance. Development is contingent
15Models not included in the paper but available in the online Appendix.
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on good political institutions and, at the same time, fosters good governance. Thus,
neglecting governance to the detriment of the economy, or the other way, is not sound
and governments need to find a balance between the two if they want to stay in power,
especially in developing economies. The results of this paper have important implications
for the general debate on electoral democracy. The aim is to have not only a democratic
system focused on economic development, but also a well-performing governance that
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Table 1: Ordinary least square regression of change in vote share of the prime
minister’s party
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Change in QoG 11.34∗∗ 7.847 89.19∗∗∗ 10.89∗∗ 54.07
(5.017) (6.998) (17.56) (5.071) (84.15)
Economic growth 0.591∗∗∗ 0.643∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 3.156 1.879
(0.205) (0.214) (0.206) (2.642) (3.673)
Previous vote share −0.228∗∗∗ −0.223∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗∗ −0.250∗∗∗
(0.079) (0.080) (0.080) (0.082) (0.085)
Good governance 0.807 0.682 0.267 0.715 0.175
(1.194) (1.179) (1.189) (1.197) (1.192)
Democracy −0.020 −0.022 −0.020 −0.019 −0.020
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018)
Coalition −0.875 −0.962 −1.239 −1.159 −1.267
(1.544) (1.535) (1.549) (1.453) (1.524)
Recession −2.512 −2.642 −3.068 −2.980 −3.281
(2.074) (2.041) (2.075) (2.058) (2.088)
Economic development 3.162∗∗∗ 3.415∗∗∗ 3.776∗∗∗ 3.972∗∗∗ 4.398∗∗









Constant −31.08∗∗∗ −33.20∗∗∗ −33.21∗∗∗ −38.27∗∗∗ −39.20∗∗
(8.772) (9.884) (7.044) (8.813) (17.86)
Observations 160 160 160 160 160
R-squared 0.286 0.289 0.321 0.293 0.322
***: p ≤ .01; **: p ≤ .05; *: p ≤ .10
Interaction 1 = Change in good governance * Economic growth
Interaction 2 = Change in good governance * Economic development
Interaction 3 = Economic growth * Economic development
Interaction 123 = Change in good governance * Economic growth * Economic development
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Table 2: Expected change in vote share (%) for the prime minister’s party for
different levels of economic growth, change in good governance and wealth
E.growth
C.gov Low Average High
(M-1sd) (M) (M+1sd)
Low economic development
Low −9.39 (−12.40,−6.30) −7.99 (−12.77,−2.72) −6.47 (−13.39,−0.06)
Average −7.61 (−10.70,−4.33) −5.63 ( −8.67,−2.28) −3.93 ( −7.81,−0.34)
High −6.14 (−10.15,−1.83) −3.61 ( −6.88,−0.23) −1.71 ( −4.99, 1.62)
Average economic development
Low −4.36 (−8.18,−0.45) −3.44 (−6.92,−0.28) −2.70 (−6.87, 1.22)
Average −2.65 (−5.85, 0.71) −1.78 (−4.69, 1.51) −0.92 (−4.61, 2.54)
High −1.07 (−4.38, 2.16) −0.24 (−3.55, 3.00) 0.65 (−3.36, 4.76)
High economic development
Low −1.77 (−6.30, 2.51) −1.28 (−5.23, 2.60) −0.98 (−6.00, 4.06)
Average −0.22 (−3.72, 3.22) 0.19 (−3.23, 3.50) 0.42 (−3.60, 4.33)
High 1.30 (−2.23, 4.77) 1.60 (−2.56, 5.33) 1.66 (−3.11, 6.57)
Note: Expected values and their 95% confidence intervals (in parantheses) calculated using Clar-
ify (King et al. 2000) based on the results in Model 5 (Table 1). Economic growth(E.growth),
change in good governance (C. gov) and economic development level are at their mean (Aver-
age,M), mean minus one standard deviation (Low, M-1sd) and mean plus one standard deviation
(High, M+1sd)
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Figure 1: The contingent marginal effect of change in good governance and
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The marginal effect plots are constructed using Berry et al.’s (2012) indications based on the
results in model 2 in Table 1.The vertical axes on the left indicate the magnitude of the marginal
effect. The vertical axes on the right are for the histogram, which depicts the distribution of
observations in the sample on the variable on the horizontal axis. The bars of the economic
growth histogram have width 5 and of change in good governance 0.05.
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Figure 2: The marginal effect of change in good governance and economic
growth on vote share and their 95% confidence intervals across the observed


































































The marginal effect plots are constructed using Berry et al.’s (2012) indications based on the
results in models 3 and 4 in Table 1. The vertical axes on the left indicate the magnitude of
the marginal effect. The vertical axes on the right are for the histogram, which depicts the
distribution of observations in the sample on the variable on the horizontal axis. The bars of
the histogram have width 4000.
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Figure 3: The marginal effect of change in good governance and economic
growth on vote share and their 95% confidence intervals from a three way
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Change in good governance
The marginal effect plots are constructed using Berry et al.’s (2012) indications based on the
results in model 5 in Table 1.The vertical axes on the left indicate the magnitude of the marginal
effect. This effect was calculated for three different values of economic wealth: its mean minus
one standard deviation (blue line, GDP/cap=$9,500), its mean(green line, GDP/cap=$25,800)
and its mean plus one standard deviation (red line, GDP/cap=$42,000). The thick extra line
indicates the values on x-axis for which the marginal effect is statistically significant at a 5%
level.
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Figure 4: The coefficient estimates of change in good of governance and eco-
nomic growth, and the effects of measurement error in variable change in
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The graphs show the coefficient estimates for change in quality of governance and economic
growth in Model 1 (Table 1) when quality of governance and the change of governance are
measured with error. I calculate the coefficients of change in governance and economic growth
for two situations: when the reliability of governance and change in governance is 80% (upper
graphs) or 90% (lower graphs). I assume the covariance between the errors of both indicators
to be 0.
